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Abstract 
This article argues that the conceptualisation of private police in current academic literature 
requires expansion to accommodate the role of the regulated sector in the Anti- Money Laundering 
(AML) framework. Firstly, it evaluates the literature on ‘private police’ and argues that its current 
parameters are too narrow to accommodate the ‘policing’ role of the regulated sector. Secondly, it 
lays out the legislative framework that has developed to deal with the problem of money 
laundering.  Thirdly, it contextualises the role of the regulated sector, examining the domestic inter-
agency policing relationships within the suspicious activity regime as operationalised in Scotland. 
Finally, it takes a closer look at how the courts have interpreted the ‘failure to report offence’ under 
s330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002 and its consequential effect on the engagement of 
the regulated sector with the SARs regime.  
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ON 5 MAY 2010, THE CROWN OFFICE AND PROCURATOR FISCAL SERVICE IN SCOTLAND            
reported that the “[b]iggest ever proceeds of crime case nets $10 million for Scottish 
communities”. This announcement came at the end of a civil recovery case that was 
passed to the Civil Recovery Unit in 2008.1 The Civil Recovery Unit is responsible for the 
implementation of civil recovery and cash forfeiture in Scotland under Part 5 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In 2004, Moscow-based businessman Anatoly Kazachkov 
came to the attention of the police following a Suspicious Activity Report made by a bank 
within the regulated sector concerning a bank transfer of $10 million from Hungary to 
Scotland.  The Scottish police, working together with the Russian authorities, were able to 
trace the source of funds finding evidence of false documentation and stolen identities en 
route. A restraint order was obtained under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In 2010, 
following the lengthy court proceedings, the funds were released to the Crown Office.2  
This case highlights the vital contribution that the regulated sector can make to policing 
investigations. However, the academic literature neglects the significant policing role of 
the regulated sector. Following an exploration of the literature and the legislative 
                       
1 Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal Service (2010). ‘Biggest ever proceeds of crime case nets $10 million for 
Scottish communities’, News release, COPFS, May. Available at http://www.copfs.gov.uk/News/Latest (accessed 
on 17 June 2010). 
2 ibid. 
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framework, this article seeks to contextualise the policing contribution of the regulated 
sector within the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regime as operationalised in Scotland, 
demonstrating the need for an expansion of the concept of ‘private police’. 
Private police 
The majority of literature which discusses those involved in private policing focuses on the 
increasing use of private security firms.3 They argue that an increasing number of public, 
commercial and voluntary bodies are involved in delivering policing services.4 For 
example, privatised spaces (shopping centres, airports, etc.) rely on private security firms 
to deliver policing services within their boundaries.  
Where the literature discusses regulatory roles of private institutions, it tends to fall 
specifically into the regulatory literature where regulatory responsibilities are examined, as 
opposed to policing literature which deals with legal, political and social aspects of social 
control.5  Significantly, there has been very little research looking at the role of private 
forms of regulation in tackling economic crime; rather, it tends to look at health and safety 
obligations and the environmental regulatory responsibilities.6 Where the literature looks 
at the regulatory responsibilities in the economic crime context, it tends to evaluate the 
economic burden that is placed on the regulated institutions as opposed to their active 
policing contributions.7  
Harvey focuses on the costs incurred by the regulated sector in complying with its 
obligations.8 She analyses how much it costs for the regulated sector to implement the 
required measures at length. She recognises that there is a gap in the academic literature 
for work quantifying ‘benefit’ to society. However, she does not undertake this task. 
Furthermore, while she acknowledges that the regulated sector considers that they are 
“unpaid policemen” and that they have “inside knowledge”, she does not explore this 
policing role nor appreciate its significance. It is important because the regulated sector is 
in a position to connect the public police to transactional information at an earlier stage in 
the commission of money laundering.  Sproat has criticised Harvey’s methodology.9 He 
analyses costs from both the regulated sector and the public sector perspectives and 
                       
3 Loader, I. (1999) ‘Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security’, Sociology, 33, pp. 373-
392; Brodeur, J.P. and Shearing, C. (2005). ‘Configuring Security and Justice’, European Journal of Criminology, 2 
(4), pp. 379-406; Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S. and Burnett, J. (2005). Plural Policing: The Mixed Economy 
of Visible Patrols in England and Wales, Bristol: Policy Press; Crawford, A. (2006). ‘Networked Governance and 
the Post-regulatory State?: Steering, Rowing and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security’, Theoretical 
Criminology, 10, pp. 449-479; Vaughan, B. (2007). ‘The Provision of Policing and the Problem of Pluralism’, 
Theoretical Criminology, 11, pp. 347-363; Johnston, L. (2007). ‘The Trajectory of ‘Private Policing’, in Henry, A. 
and Smith, D., Transformations of Policing. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 25-49. 
4 Loader, I. (1999) ‘Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security’, Sociology, 33, pp. 373-
392. 
5 Shearing, C. D. (1993). ‘A Constitutive Conception of Regulation’, in Grabosky, P and Braithwaite, J (eds), 
Business Regulation and Australia’s Future, Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology; Gill, P. (2002). 
‘Policing and Regulation: What is the Difference?’ Social Legal Studies, 11, pp. 523-546. 
6 Williams, J. (2005). ‘Reflections on the Private versus Public Policing of Economic Crime’, Brit.J.Criminol, 45, pp. 
316-336 at p317. For an environmental example, see Abbot, C. (2009). ‘The Regulatory Enforcement and 
Sanctions Act 2008’, Env L Rev, 11(1), pp. 38-45, which looks at the role of Local Authorities in enforcing 
environmental health obligations. 
7 Harvey, J. (2004). ‘Compliance and Reporting Issues Arising for Financial Institutions from Money Laundering 
Regulations: A Preliminary Cost Benefit Study’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 7(4), pp. 333-346; Harvey, 
J. (2005). ‘An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 8 (4), pp. 339-
345; Sproat, P. (2007). ‘The New Policing of Assets and the New Assets of Policing: A Tentative Financial Cost-
benefit Analysis of the UK’s Anti-money Laundering and Asset Recovery Regime’, Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, 10 (3), pp. 277-299. 
8 ibid. 
9 Sproat, n7 above. 
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acknowledges where the data is merely indicative or secondary, and in this respect 
insulates his methodology from critique. He goes on to attempt to analyse the ‘benefit’, 
but concludes that the regime is still bedding down. In his later work, Sproat spends more 
time quantifying the benefits of the AML framework.10 Through a myriad of 
methodological disclaimers, he finds that the system does not pay for itself.  The analysis 
does not attempt to provide a qualitative appraisal of the ‘benefit’.  Sproat argues that 
those who support the AML framework are likely to argue that ‘benefit’ extends beyond 
the costs and into the realms of punitive rewards. Neither Harvey nor Sproat highlight the 
material contribution that the regulated sector is able to make to the policing of money 
laundering. Similarly, they do not acknowledge the position of power in which the 
regulated sector is, given its access to customer/client information. 
Sheptycki defines private policing simply as “contract based” policing.11 However, it is 
argued here that this interpretation is too narrow and that the AML framework has 
imposed on the regulated sector legislative responsibilities of a policing character.  
Academic literature must bring policing and regulation together since the AML 
obligations placed on the regulated sector means that its members enter into the policing 
arena and play a fundamental role in supporting the public police in their investigations. 
These obligations move the regulated sector from a simple compliance role into that of 
private police. 
The problem of money laundering 
The first articulation of a collective ‘money laundering’ concept appeared in the 1988 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances. Money laundering was initially perceived as mainly linked to drug-trafficking. 
Through discussions at the G7 summit in 1989, when the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) was established, its conceptualisation as a threat to the international economy 
came to the fore.12 Money laundering was acknowledged as a major global threat to the 
financial markets. The establishment of the FATF harnessed the commitment of 16 
members (which included the European Commission) to band together in their attempts 
to draft national and international policies tackling money laundering.13  
The remit of FATF laid down in its 2008-2012 revised mandate is to work to ensure that its 
40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and nine Recommendations on Terrorist 
Financing are recognised globally.14 FATF will continue to focus on three main areas of 
activity; standard setting, ensuring effective compliance with those standards and 
identifying money laundering and terrorist financing threats. FATF highlights jurisdictions 
that have significant deficiencies in their AML and combating financing of terrorism 
regimes, and these are to be categorised as ‘high-risk jurisdictions’. FATF will identify 
systemic money laundering and terrorist financing threats through the typologies process 
                       
10 Sproat, P. (2009). ‘To What Extent is the UK's Anti-money Laundering and Asset Recovery Regime Used 
against Organised Crime?’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 12 (2), pp. 134-150; Sproat, P. (2009). ‘Payback 
Time? To What Extent has the New Policing of Assets Provided New Assets for Policing?’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 12 (4), pp. 392-405 
11 Sheptycki, J. (2002). ‘Accountability Across the Policing Field: Towards a General Cartography of 
Accountability for Post-modern Policing’, Policing & Society, Special Issue on Police Accountability in Europe 
(Guest Editor Monica den Boer), 12 (4), pp. 323-338. 
12 Contained in the Economic Declaration Released by the Summit of the Arch, July 16, 1989. Also see 
Mitsilegas, V. and Gilmore, B. (2007). ‘The EU Legislative Framework against Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards’, I.C.L.Q, 56 (1), pp. 119-140. 
13 This membership has now increased to 34 members. See http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_32236836_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 18 June 2010).   
14 Initially, the FATF drafted 40 Recommendations which dealt with money laundering. In 2001, the remit of the 
FATF was expanded to include tackling terrorist financing; consequently, they drafted 8 further 
Recommendations. In 2003, the FATF revised all Recommendations and added a 9th Recommendation. 
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where they gather and disseminate information on methods, trends and techniques. FATF 
will support the development of national threat assessments and will regularly publish a 
global threat assessment. Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, FATF will look to new 
emerging threats. It acknowledges that globalisation brings with it new risks and the 
central consideration internationally must be to protect the integrity of the financial 
system.  Looking to their 40 Recommendations, ‘risk’ terminology permeates, yet there is 
no definition or interpretative guidance given in the document. From June 2007 to 
October 2009 (and presumably to be periodically revised), FATF issued separate guidance 
on the risk-based approach which was sector specific.  The guidance aims to: 
1) Support the development of a common understanding of what the risk-based 
approach involves.  
2) Outline the high-level principles involved in applying the risk-based approach.  
3) Indicate good practice in the design and implementation of an effective risk-based 
approach.15  
Countries which are seeking to institute an appropriate risk-based system must 
understand the risk that they are tackling.  They must have information available to them 
that allows them to assess the risk appropriately or, in other words, “they must understand 
the actual and potential money laundering and terrorist financing risk.”16  
The participation of the European Commission, together with numerous Member States in 
the FATF, helped to push forward legislative provisions in the European Communities 
(now EU). In 1991, building on the FATF 40 Recommendations which were first published 
in 1990, the European Union produced the First Money Laundering Directive on 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering17. Ten 
years later, in 2001 the Second Money Laundering Directive was introduced.18 This 
Directive extended the offences covered by the First Directive, extended the range of 
professions covered and established the requirement for the establishment of a Financial 
Intelligent Unit within each Member State who would be responsible for administering the 
suspicious activity regime. The Third Money Laundering Directive was issued in 2005 and 
came into force in 200719. It incorporated the 2003 revisions of the FATF 
Recommendations, extended the scope of the Directive to cover any transaction linked to 
terrorist financing, instituted customer due diligence measures, enhanced diligence 
measures in respect of politically exposed persons and established penalties for failing to 
report suspicious activity. 
The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002, together with the Money Laundering Regulations 
of 2007, lays down the criminal and regulatory sanctions that deal with money laundering 
transposing the European provisions into the UK framework. They determine what 
activities are included in the crime of ‘money laundering’ and the consequential provisions 
that facilitate its investigation and prosecution. The POCA 2002 Explanatory Notes (at n6) 
describe money laundering as “the process by which the proceeds of crime are converted 
into assets which appear to have legitimate origin.” In other words some kind of criminal 
activity has taken place which has resulted in a material benefit. To ensure this benefit can 
be used without detection by law enforcement authorities, it must be disguised in such a 
way that it is no longer connected to its original source. In achieving untraceable funds, 
those businesses which deal with financial interests are the most at risk of exploitation. The 
                       
15 Paraphrased from the FATF website, available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/63/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_44513535_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed on 17 June 
2010). 
16 De Koker, L. (2009). ‘Identifying and Managing Low Money Laundering Risk: Perspectives on FATF’s Risk-
based Guidance’, Journal of Financial Crime, 16 (4), pp. 334-352 at p. 337. 
17 91/308/EEC  
18 2001/97/EC 
19 2005/60/EC  
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association between money laundering and low level criminality through serious 
organised crime, taken together with the potential risk to the economy, moved anti-
money laundering procedures up the political agenda.  
Moves to highlight how money laundering relates to criminality, with an emphasis placed 
on how much it impacts daily life, have been embraced by both policing and political 
bodies in an attempt to harness the necessary public support to drive forward 
criminalisation. For example, the UK Threat Assessment of Organised Crime (2009/10) 
published by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), highlights the link between 
money laundering and organised crime explaining that “most organised criminal activity is 
directly or indirectly aimed at making money and therefore criminal finances and profits 
underpin organised crime.”20 Similarly, “Letting Our Communities Flourish: A Strategy for 
Tackling Organised Crime in Scotland” published by the Scottish Government in 2009 was 
at pains to highlight how far the tentacles of organised crime reach and emphasised 
criminals’ reliance on money laundering activities to sustain their empires. The breadth of 
criminal activity and the variety of environments exploited by criminals has forced the 
traditional public police to diversify and pluralise, thereby embracing the regulated sector. 
The public police and the regulated sector 
Reiner argues that “anyone living in modern society has this intuitive notion of what the 
police are”.21 However, when one tries to articulate a definition of the police, the debate is 
not so much concerned with what the police are, as it is with what they do – be that what 
they actually do, or what they should do.22 The definitions narrated here are focused on 
facilitating an understanding of the role that the public police play in the AML framework 
so that this can be contrasted and reconciled with the role of the private police. 
The public police are organisations established in connection with the state to assist in the 
maintenance of order and the prevention of crime.23 In relation to AML in particular, there 
are a number of policing agencies involved in the implementation and enforcement of the 
UK framework. They appear on the surface to be hierarchical. However, their roles overlap 
and intertwine as they attempt to snare money launderers. These roles and responsibilities 
‘in action’ demonstrate that despite the inter-dependence of policing agencies, there 
remains a definitive line between the private and public police. The current portrayal of 
the private police in academic literature does not accommodate the role of the regulated 
sector or professional bodies (in their capacity as supervisory authorities) in the AML 
framework.   
In Scotland, responsibility for law and order generally lies with the Scottish Executive and 
Scottish Parliament under The Police (Scotland) Act 1967. However, certain matters are 
reserved to the UK Parliament at Westminster, including national security, terrorism, 
firearms, drugs and specifically the financial markets and money laundering as detailed in 
The Scotland Act 1998 Schedule 5. Consequently, the policing arrangements in respect of 
AML operations in Scotland are administered on the basis of UK wide legislation.24 
                       
20 SOCA. (2010). ‘The UK Threat Assessment of Organised Crime 2009/10’, p. 8. Available at 
http://www.soca.gov.uk/threats. 
21 Reiner, R. (2000). The Politics of the Police. Oxford: Oxford University Press, UK, 3rd Ed., p. 1. 
22 Bayley, D. H. (2005). ‘What Do the Police Do?’, in T. Newburn (ed.), Police: Key Readings. Cullompton: Willan, 
pp. 141-148. 
23 Sheptycki, n11 above; Reiner, n21 above. 
24 It should be noted that moves are being made to try and devolve the policing of drugs detailed in ‘Letting 
Our Communities Flourish - One Year On: A Strategy for Tackling Organised Crime in Scotland’ published by 
the Scottish Government in 2010. 
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The most significant policing agency within the UK AML framework is the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). SOCA was set up under the Serious Organised Crime and 
Police Act 2005 (SOCPA 2005). SOCA is a hybrid agency, which subsumed the National 
Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service and in addition, certain 
responsibilities of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in relation to drug 
trafficking, and Her Majesty’s Immigration Service (HMIS) in relation to human trafficking.25 
SOCA is significant because it contains the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UK FIU) which is 
responsible for administering the suspicious activity regime across the whole of the UK. As 
noted above, the Third Money Laundering Directive laid down a requirement on Member 
States to establish a national Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), if they had not already done 
so. To all intents and purposes, the UK had a national financial intelligence unit in the form 
of the Financial Intelligence Division of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS). 
However, when SOCA was established in 2006, it took over the responsibilities of NCIS and 
consequently the UK FIU.26 In accordance with Article 29 of the Third Money Laundering 
Directive, which determined that a national FIU should be responsible for collecting, 
analysing, and disseminating suspicious transactions reports, SOCA is now responsible for 
administering the UK Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) regime. 
Section 2 SOCPA 2005 lays down SOCA’s functions to include the prevention and 
detection of serious organised crime and to contribute to its reduction and the mitigation 
of its consequences. Its functions are expanded further into the realm of crime in general 
under section 3. Neither ‘serious organised crime’ nor ‘crime’ is defined in the Act. 
Nevertheless, it does lay down a requirement for the Secretary of State to set strategic 
priorities (in consultation with SOCA and Scottish Ministers), and under s61 there is a list of 
offences which fall within SOCA’s remit, including but not limited to, those specified in 
Schedule 4 POCA 2002 Lifestyle offences: Scotland. Taken together, these provide some 
guidance as to what is considered serious organised crime and crime more generally of 
interest to SOCA. Although SOCA is a key player in the UK AML framework as a whole, it 
has particular restrictions placed on how it interacts with the Scottish public police. In 
terms of section 22 SOCPA 2005, SOCA can only carry out activities in Scotland in relation 
to an offence which it suspects has, or is being,  committed, if it has the agreement of the 
Lord Advocate. Indeed, despite SOCA being established in 2006, SOCA’s 2010-2011 Annual 
Plan narrates the first stand-alone investigation in Scotland which took place over the 
course of 2009 and 2010.27 
In Scotland, there are eight territorial public police forces, which cover different 
geographical areas.28 Within each territorial force, there is a Financial Intelligence Unit 
(FIU), and this department deals most closely with anti-money laundering. In addition, 
there is the Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency (SDEA), which was established in April 
2001. SDEA was renamed the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA) by 
the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act in 2006. SCDEA’s functions are 
laid down in section 2(2) as: preventing and detecting serious organised crime; 
contributing to the reduction of such crime in other ways and to the mitigation of its 
consequences; and gathering, storing and analysing information relevant to the 
prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences; or the reduction of crime 
                       
25 Harfield, C. (2006). ‘SOCA: A Paradigm Shift in British Policing’, Brit. J. Criminol, 46, pp. 743-761; Fitzpatrick, D. 
(2005). ‘Advising the Serious Organised Crime Agency: The Role of the Specialist Prosecutors’, Journal of 
Financial Crime, 12 (3), pp. 251-263; Fitzpatrick, D. (2006). ‘Crime Fighting in the Twenty-first Century? A 
Practitioner’s Assessment of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005’, Journal of Money Laundering 
Control, 9 (2), pp. 129-140; Leong, A. (2007). ‘Anti-money Laundering Measures in the UK: A Review of Recent 
Legislation and FSA’s Risk-based Approach’, Co. Law, 28 (2), pp. 35-42. 
26 International Monetary Fund. (2004). ‘Financial intelligence Units: An Overview’, Washington D.C., p. 29. 
27 SOCA Annual Plan 2010-2011, p. 14. 
28 Donnelly, D. and Scott, K. (2005). Policing Scotland. Cullompton: Willan.  
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in other ways or the mitigation of its consequences.29 This provision mirrors the remit of 
SOCA. SCDEA’s strategic priorities are laid down by the Scottish Government under 
section 13 and are disseminated through SCDEA’s Annual Plan in accordance with section 
14. The 2010-2011 Annual Plan (which forms part of a larger five-year Strategic Plan 2010-
2015) details their priorities to include: the identification of criminal assets for restraint 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; to make it more difficult for serious organised crime 
groups to obtain the services of specialists to protect and launder illegal gains, and 
specifically to engage with the business sector and assist legitimate businesses in 
protecting themselves from serious organised crime [emphasis added]. Following two 
reports issued in 2000, the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary Report on the Confiscation of 
Criminal Assets in Scotland “Making Crime Pay” and “Recovering the Proceeds of Crime” 
Report by the UK Cabinet Office’s Performance and Innovation Unit, the Association of 
Chief Police Officers of Scotland (ACPOS) Crime Standing Committee set up a Multi-
Agency Working Group to consider the issues raised. The reports highlighted that financial 
investigation was being sidelined both in respect of resourcing and usage. Reflecting on 
the reports, the Multi-Agency Working Group concluded that the way forward was the 
establishment of a Scottish Multi-Agency Financial Investigation Unit/Money laundering 
Unit.30 Consequently, in September 2001 the Scottish Money Laundering Unit (SMLU) was 
established within SCDEA. 
The SMLU contains staff from SCDEA, HMRC, and the Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP). Its functions are to identify assets gained through illegal activity, such as drug 
trafficking and serious and organised crime, and to make these assets available to the 
courts for confiscation, to target those involved in laundering criminal assets, to provide 
high quality financial intelligence, to service the needs of SDEA (which became SCDEA) 
Operations and Intelligence Groups, and to provide assistance to Scottish Police forces in 
respect of financial investigation.31 Subsequently, the SMLU became the single point of 
contact for the Scottish police service in the administration of suspicious financial activity 
disclosed to SOCA by institutions within the regulated sector.32 While there is a striking 
similarity with the functions of SOCA, it is intended that SOCA and SCDEA engage in 
partnership rather than duplication, and this is borne out operationally through a 
Partnership Agreement between the agencies.33 SOCPA 2005 sections 23 to 25 lay down a 
number of provisions which provide a legislative basis for such agreements. This mutual 
assistance can be at the request of either agency. These provisions are not limited to these 
two agencies and would provide a legislative basis for any Scottish force to request 
assistance (or to be approached for assistance by SOCA).    
There are additional public police forces, such as the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the 
British Transport Police, that have a UK wide jurisdiction and consequently play a role in 
Scottish policing.  Moreover, the Security Service, MI5, works with SOCA in tackling serious 
crime. SOCPA 2005 amended the Security Services Act 1989 to clarify the role of MI5, 
specifying that MI5 should act in support of the activities of SOCA. It is difficult to assess 
how this relationship functions since both MI5 and SOCA are, due the sensitivity of their 
areas of work, not subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or its counterpart the 
Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, and as far as we can ascertain there is no 
academic literature on the subject. Similarly, MI6, the UK’s external intelligence service, 
could potentially police in the anti-money laundering arena, since they are mandated 
under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 section 1 to act in support of the prevention or 
detection of serious crime. While acknowledging that both MI5 and MI6 may have a role in 
                       
29 Paraphrased from s2(2) Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006. 
30 SDEA Annual Report 2000-2001, p. 15. 
31 SDEA Annual Report 2001-2002, p. 18. 
32 SDEA Annual Report 2002-2003, p. 9. 
33 SCDEA Annual Report 2005-2006, p. 7. 
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the overarching policing of money laundering, the focus of this article is on the 
public/private policing nexus. This is best illustrated by focusing on the SARs regime, and 
in this respect as these agencies do not have a direct role they will be put to one side.  
The private police involved in the AML framework are those who fall within the regulated 
sector detailed in POCA 2002 Schedule 9 Part 1, including banking institutions, businesses 
providing investment services, accountants, tax advisors, estate agents, auctioneers, 
casinos and many more. Straddling the gap between the public and private police in this 
arena are those defined as “supervisory authorities” under Reg. 23 Money Laundering 
Regulations (MLR) 2007 and “designated authority” under Reg. 36. Supervisory authorities 
laid down in Reg. 23 include the Financial Services Authority, the Office of Fair Trading, 
professional bodies (listed in Schedule 3 MLR 2007), the Commissioners of HMRC, the 
Gambling Commission, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (DETI) of 
Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State who is the designated supervisory authority for 
insolvency practitioners authorised by him under section 393 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Of these supervisory authorities, the FSA, OFT, HMRC and DETI are also designated 
authorities under Reg. 36.34 
Reg. 24 sets out that it is the responsibility of the supervisory authority to monitor 
supervisees. The supervisory authority must take appropriate measures to secure their 
compliance and, where it comes to the attention of the supervisor that a person may have 
engaged in money laundering, they must report this to SOCA. The remit of designated 
authorities goes further. They are given more specific enforcement powers under Part 5 
including: the power to require information (Reg. 37), power of entry without a warrant (in 
limited circumstances under Reg. 38), and power to enter premises with a warrant (Reg. 
39). All designated authorities have the power to impose civil penalties where certain 
regulations have not been complied with under Reg. 42. All violations liable to civil 
penalties under Reg. 42 are also criminal offences in terms of Reg. 45, with the minor 
exception of Reg. 11(1d), which requires “a relevant person to consider whether he is 
required to make a disclosure under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or Part 3 of 
the Terrorism Act 2000”. Presumably, this has not been made a criminal offence since to 
prove or disprove consideration would be extremely difficult and the issue can be 
adequately dealt with through the civil penalties under Reg. 42. Reg 46 sets out that the 
designated authorities, with the exception of the FSA, are able to institute prosecution 
proceedings in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, they do not have 
jurisdiction in Scotland. It is for the Procurator Fiscal within the Crown Office and 
Procurator Fiscal Service to decide whether to proceed with a prosecution in Scotland. 
It appears that the majority of these authorities, supervisory or designated, fall within the 
definition of public police.  They are established in connection with the state and following 
the provisions of MLR 2007 and POCA 2002 have been placed in a role which entails the 
maintenance of order and the prevention of crime. For example, the FSA was established 
by the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000. While theoretically an independent 
body receiving no government funding, their objectives have been set by FSMA 2000, 
specifically including reducing the extent to which it is possible for a business to be used 
for a purpose connected with financial crime. Similarly, HMRC was established by the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005. HMRC subsumed the functions of the 
Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise under s5 of the 2005 Act. In exercising these 
functions, HMRC are in the position of gathering information which could potentially lead 
to the discovery of criminal activity ranging from fraud and tax evasion to money 
laundering. Furthermore, through their responsibilities and powers given by both POCA 
                       
34 Hynes, P. Furlong, R. and Rudolf, N. (2009), International Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: A UK 
Perspective. London: Sweet and Maxwell, p. 26. 
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2002 and MLR 2007, they are in a position to investigate and prosecute in England, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland. Although, as noted above, they would have to refer matters to the 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland.35 However, it is worthy of note that 
the professional bodies listed in Sch. 3 that fall into the category of supervisory authorities, 
vary in modes of establishment, funding arrangements and accountability.36  
Unfortunately, further examination of these 22 institutions is beyond the scope of this 
article. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of how the public police and regulated 
sector interact in the SARs regime. 
Figure 1: Basic UK AML structure 
Figure drawn by the author on the basis of the relevant legislative provisions  
and the SCDEA annual reports 
 
The regulated sector has a duty to report any activity where it is suspected that an 
individual is engaged in money laundering.37 SARs are passed internally to the nominated 
officer, universally referred to as the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO), who is 
obliged to determine whether it is required to make a report. If the MLRO is satisfied that a 
report requires to be made, it is made to the SOCA. An individual can also report directly to 
a person authorised for such purposes by the Director General of SOCA. Also, where 
suspicion is raised in relation to a particular transaction, the regulated sector has a duty to 
seek consent before proceeding.38 Once the initial request for consent has been made, the 
hands of the regulated institution are tied. Consent can be inferred when the period of 
                       
35 POCA 2002, s2C and MLR 2007, Reg. 46. 
36  The professional bodies listed in MLR 2007 Sch. 3 correspond to those listed in POCA 2002 Sch. 9 Part 2. 
37 POCA 2002 s330. 
38 POCA 2002 s327, s328 and s329. 
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seven days has passed since the report was made and no notice of refusal has been 
received.39 Where the reporting institution receives notice that consent is refused, they will 
be able to act once a moratorium period of 31 days has passed. SOCA collates relevant 
SARs which are accessible through a database window by territorial forces.40 The territorial 
forces can view SARs that have been allocated to them by SOCA. In addition, the SCDEA 
(SMLU) can see SARs allocated to all the Scottish territorial forces. SCDEA will sift these 
reports and run further checks to identify those of most interest. It has been estimated that 
SCDEA receives about 8,000 SARs per year.41 They put together parcels of the information 
they have collected and highlight the relevant reports to the appropriate territorial FIU. 
The FIU then decides whether or not the SAR requires action or provides intelligence of 
such significance as to warrant entry on the Scottish Intelligence Database (SID). 
Increasing the amount of intelligence that can be taken from a SAR is a key priority of 
SOCA identified in Part 3 of their SARs Annual Report 2009.  ‘Intelligence’ here is a piece of 
information which has been interpreted and analysed as potentially relevant to an 
investigation of criminal activity and consequently may inform future action.42 The SID 
database is accessible by all Scottish territorial forces. 
FIUs will have ongoing caseloads where they are trying to compile (or refine) financial 
profiles intending to seek restraint or confiscation. In doing this, they may have to call 
upon the regulated sector to supply further information. If the regulated sector refuses to 
disclose the information, the FIU can have recourse to the investigatory powers available 
under Part 8 POCA 2002. Chapter 3 deals with the Scottish provisions, which include 
production orders and search warrants, and, of more significance to the regulated sector, 
customer information orders and account monitoring orders.  While maintaining their own 
caseload, FIUs participate in ongoing force operations. These are projects that involve 
multiple policing departments. They focus on specific targets or activities that are selected 
by the Chief Constable.43 The officer in charge of a particular operation would contact the 
FIU to see what intelligence they are able to contribute. Mainstreaming financial 
intelligence within force operations facilitates identification of assets for restraint at an 
earlier stage and is of increasing importance in implementing POCA 2002.44 In effect, the 
FIU looks at SID in a new light.  This new focus may draw their attention to a previously 
unassuming SAR. The operation has made the SAR of more significance and it may be 
appropriate for the FIU to investigate the SAR anew, again approaching the regulated 
sector for further information.  
The public police in Scotland have invested in the development of their FIUs with the 
support of the Scottish Government as part of “Letting Our Communities Flourish: A 
Strategy for Tackling Organised Crime in Scotland” noted earlier. Lothian and Borders, 
Tayside and Strathclyde police forces received a share of the money that has been 
recovered from criminals. This money has been used to recruit 19 financial investigators.  
The individual police forces had to decide whether to recruit police officers or civilian 
financial investigators. In making their decision they will have been conscious of the 
constant pressure to provide ‘best value’45 while adopting effective strategies to tackle 
                       
39 POCA 2002 s335(2). 
40 Leong, A. n25 above. 
41 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (HMICS) and the Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland 
(IPS).(2009). Joint Thematic Report on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, p. 34. 
42 Innes, M, Fielding, N. and Cope, N. (2005). ‘The Appliance of Science?' The Theory and Practice of Crime 
intelligence Analysis’, Brit. J. Criminol, 45 (1) pp. 37-57. 
43 Donnelly, D. and Scott, K. n28 above, p. 17. 
44 HMICS & IPS. (2009). Joint Thematic Report on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, p. 23; Murray, K. (2010). 
‘Dismantling Organised Crime Groups Through Enforcement of the POCA Money Laundering Offences’, 
Journal of Money Laundering Control, 13 (1), pp. 7-14. 
45 Although the concept of ‘best value’ first originated under the Labour government in an attempt to sweep 
away the competitive compulsory tender that had been adopted by the Conservative government and geared 
towards Councils, it has now become firmly entrenched in public police management. See Martin, S. (2000). 
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money laundering. The ability of the FIUs to influence operational and strategic choices 
depends on their internal authority structure and how it is impacted by the acknowledged 
command and control structure of the public police.46 Civilian staff are at the bottom of 
the internal authority structure; consequently, increasing the number of civilian staff is 
unlikely to improve the ability of the FIUs to influence operational or strategic choices. 
There are limits on the role civilian staff are able to play within FIUs. Civilian staff in 
Scotland cannot execute investigative orders, such as production orders or search 
warrants, since this requires a police officer.47 Nevertheless, civilian staff provide a cheaper 
alternative to police officers. In addition, as they often come from external agencies, 
frequently as members of the regulated sector, they are trained in specialist skills such as 
accounting and insolvency, which is of particular assistance. Moreover, their experience in 
the regulated sector means that they bring with them the ability to understand the 
burden placed on the regulated sector and are able to foster relationships of trust. Rhodes 
argues that in the field of policing it is the “shared values and norms [that] are the glue 
which holds the complex set of relationships together; trust is essential for co-operative 
behaviour”.48 This is particularly crucial given the sensitive nature of the material that is 
shared between the public and private police in their attempts to tackle money 
laundering. Such knowledge exchange is also available to the regulated sector through 
the recruitment of ex-police officers as compliance officers, and this has been found to be 
advantageous in fostering relationships of trust between public and private institutions.49 
In addition to reporting responsibilities under POCA 2002, the regulated sector has 
obligations under MLR 2007. Reg. 5 requires that those in the regulated sector undertake 
customer due diligence measures which are known as the ‘know your client’ obligations. 
They have a duty to verify the identity of customers or beneficial owners and also to be 
aware of the nature of their clients’ business. They must monitor this relationship on an 
ongoing basis (Reg. 8). The obligation is geared towards enabling members of the 
regulated sector to spot transactions which are out of the ordinary and thereby placing 
them in a position where they have a duty to report.50 Moreover, under Part 3, they must 
keep records of this information, adopt appropriate procedures and train their staff. In 
fulfilling these regulations, the regulated sector undertakes crucial collection of 
intelligence, and they are responsible for connecting this intelligence to the public police 
through their use of SARs. Does the access of the regulated sector to customer/client 
information (which may later prove to have intelligence value) shift the balance of power 
from the state to the regulated sector? SARs put them in a position to materially control 
                                                                      
‘Implementing ‘Best Value’: Local Public Services in Transition’, Public Administration, 78 (1), pp. 209–227.  This 
is evidenced both north and south of the border in the Scottish Policing Performance Framework and ACPOS 
National Procurement Strategy. 
46 HMICS & IPS, n44 above, p. 14. It is for the Chief Constable to make operational decisions taking on board the 
pressures on available resources. In making such decisions, the Chief Constable will receive advice from senior 
officers. It was acknowledged in the HMICS & IPS report that FIUs in Scotland do not have the requisite 
representation to highlight the potential of the department and secure appropriate resources. However, with 
the recent appointment of ACPOS Proceeds of Crime Champions this is likely to improve. The role of the 
ACPOS Champions is to mainstream the use of POCA 2002. As it is the FIU who currently have the most 
expertise, it is likely they will be instrumental is supporting the ACPOS Champions. See ‘New POCA 
‘Champions’ to disrupt serious and organised crime’ COPFS Press Release. Available at: 
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/News/Releases/2010/03/30103126 (accessed on 20 June 2010). 
47 Investigative Orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Code of Practice Issued under s410 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
48 Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007). ‘Understanding Governance: Ten Years On’, Organization Studies, 28 (8), pp. 1243-
1264 at p1246. 
49 Verhage, A. (2009a). ‘Compliance and AML in Belgium: A Booming Sector with Growing Pains’, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, 12 (2), pp. 113-133; Verhage, A. (2009b). ‘The Anti Money Laundering Complex: 
Power Pantomime or Potential Playoff?’, in J. Shapland and P. Ponsaers (eds), The Informal Economy and 
Connections with Organised Crime. The Hague: BJu Legal Publishers; Favarel-Garrigues, G., Godefroy, T. and 
Lascouomes, P. (2008). ‘Sentinels in the Banking Industry: Private Actors and the Fight against Money 
Laundering in France’, Brit. J. Criminol, 48 (1), pp. 1-19. 
50 Harvey, J. n7 above; Leong, A. n25 above. 
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their policing contribution.  S330(2) POCA 2002 accommodates a subjective test of 
‘suspicion’; consequently, they can choose whether or not to make a SAR. In deciding what 
constitutes suspicious activity, they are effectively deciding what should be brought to the 
attention of the state and what should remain a private matter.51 They are able to balance 
the interests of the state against private interests. 
There are two prongs to the private interests of the regulated sector: those of the 
institution itself and those of its clients and customers. Each influences the engagement of 
the regulated sector with the AML regime in the UK. As highlighted previously, where 
suspicion has been raised in relation to a particular transaction, members of the regulated 
sector have a duty to seek consent before proceeding.52 While they may be called upon to 
justify their actions to clients, they must be wary lest they fall foul of the “tipping off” 
offence and face criminal sanctions.53 The precariousness of the position of the regulated 
sector has been exacerbated by the recent English civil case of Shah v HSBC Private Bank 
Ltd.54 In this case Mr Shah, along with his wife, sought damages from HSBC for their failure 
to carry out transactions in accordance with his instructions, breaching their duty towards 
them. Several transactions were instructed by Mr Shah at different intervals. These 
transactions were placed on hold while HSBC complied with their statutory obligations. A 
number of disclosures were made and responded to by SOCA. There were four 
transactions in total in respect to which HSBC refused to act until they had received 
consent. Mr Shah claimed that the effective freezing of the Shahs’ assets caused a cascade 
of events resulting in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe seizing his assets over which they 
had control, totalling $307.5million. HSBCs mounted a defence claiming that they has 
suspected that the transactions constituted money laundering, and consequently as they 
had made an authorised disclosure in accordance with s338 POCA 2002, they were unable 
to act earlier than they did because to do so would be illegal. The action proceeded to a 
summary judgement, which found in favour of HSBC on the grounds that since Mr Shah 
was not challenging the good faith of the bank, there was no real prospect of Mr Shah 
establishing that there had been a breach of duty by the bank. Mr Shah appealed on this 
basis that his claim should not have been dismissed at such an early juncture. 
Mr Shah’s case was largely based on the fact that HSBC had failed to carry out his 
instructions promptly and that, in raising the defence that they suspected Mr Shah of 
being involved in money laundering, they should be required to adduce evidence of their 
suspicion. In affirming R v Da Silva, 55 the Court found that, while there is no requirement 
for ‘suspicion’ to be “firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts” or based on 
“reasonable grounds”, the fact that ‘suspicion’ has arisen must be open to proof, since to 
allow the defence of a suspicion of money laundering without any challenge would “in 
effect, be giving carte blanche to every bank to decline to execute their customer’s 
instructions without any court investigation.”56 The judgment delivered by Lord Justice 
Longmore highlights that the court appreciated that POCA 2002 has placed banks in an 
“unenviable position”, balancing the threat of criminal sanction against the threat of civil 
action by their clients. Nevertheless, Lord Justice Longmore emphasised at paragraph 32 
that: 
                       
51 Marshall, P. (2010). ‘Does Shah v HSBC Private Bank Ltd Make the Anti-money Laundering Consent Regime 
Unworkable?,’Butterworth Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 25 (5), pp. 287-290. For further 
discussion of the interplay between the subjective and objective tests present in POCA 2002 s330, see Swinton, 
K. (2007). ‘When Do You Suspect it is Reasonable to Disclose?’, Scottish Law Gazette, 75 (2), pp. 52-54. 
52 POCA 2002 s328(2)(a) and s329(2)(a). 
53 POCA 2002 s333A. 
54 [2010] EWCA Civ 31. 
55 [2007] 1 WLR 303. 
56 [2010] EWCA Civ 31 para 30. 
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it cannot be right that proper litigation should be summarily dismissed without 
appropriate inquiry of any kind.  The normal procedures of the court are not to be 
side-stepped merely because Parliament has enacted stringent measures to inhibit 
the notorious evil of money-laundering, unless there is express statutory provision to 
that effect. 
This makes it abundantly clear that the court will not insulate the regulated sector from 
challenge simply because they have been given a statutory duty to assist in tackling 
money laundering.  If they were to be afforded such privilege, the court would expect this 
to be specifically included in the legislative provision. Building on R v Da Silva, 57 this case 
emphasised the potential for actions for damages against regulated institutions where 
SARs have been made resulting in a delay in the execution of clients’ instructions. While 
the Court acknowledges that these institutions are in a difficult position, it is emphasised 
that the burden remains theirs to carry. Nevertheless, rather than this case alarming the 
regulated sector, it should provide additional impetus to engage with a ‘risk-based’ 
approach establishing appropriate practices and procedures.  In doing so, members of the 
regulated sector will not only be meeting their statutory obligations, but they will be 
arming themselves with sufficient evidence to rebut civil claims from clients. 
The point has yet to receive judicial attention in Scotland. However, looking in particular to 
the case of Mohammad Ahmad v HMA,58 also known as the ‘Makkah Travel case’, it 
appears that the Scottish courts are likely to follow the decision in Shah v HSBC Private 
Bank Ltd 59(should it be brought to their attention). This case was a criminal appeal against 
conviction on a number of counts, including a failure to make a disclosure contrary to s330 
POCA 2002. In this case, Mr Ahmad has been engaged in a business that is part of the 
regulated sector, Makkah Travel Ltd. The business acted as a travel agent and also as a 
money transmission bureau, administering transfers of money from Asian clients 
employed in the UK to family members in Pakistan. It came to the attention of HM 
Customs that there were some misgivings as to the legitimacy of the company’s business. 
It was when cash was paid into the bank by Makkah Travel that the bank reported 
suspicious activity.  No reports had been made by Makkah Travel in relation to the funds 
they had received or the transactions that they were being requested to implement. HM 
Customs consequently set up a surveillance operation, which founded the Crowns original 
case. It appeared that the accused had received a large amount of cash delivered in 
holdalls on numerous occasions from a Mr Gurie (who was a co-accused in respect of other 
charges). Mr Gurie was later acquitted on all charges. It was argued for the appellant that a 
proper construction of s330 required the Crown to prove that the money laundering 
allegedly known or suspected was indeed taking place, and since Mr Guthrie was 
acquitted it would be inconsistent for the jury to return a verdict which relied on the 
appellant’s apparent failure to report activity which had, in reality, been found not to have 
taken place. However, the Court rejected this argument, explaining that it was based on a 
misunderstanding of the relevant section. Lord Kingarth further explained that s330(2) did 
not state that money laundering must be taking place for suspicion to be raised, rather 
“[a]s a matter of language it is obvious that a person may suspect that something is taking 
place, albeit it later turns out that his suspicion is ill-founded.”60 The emphasis here 
appears to lie firmly on the regulated institution to report any suspicious activity at the first 
opportunity. Lord Kingarth highlights that the purpose of the section is to prevent money 
laundering and to assist investigatory authorities, not to encourage those in the regulated 
sector to undertake the investigation themselves.   
                       
57 [2007] 1 WLR 303. 
58 [2009] HCJAC 60(HCJ). 
59 [2010] EWCA Civ 31. 
60 [2009] HCJAC 60(HCJ) para 30. 
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While this case deals with the obligation for institutions to submit a SAR report in the first 
instance, the Shah case deals with duties owed to the client in respect of such a report 
once lodged. These cases illustrate the potentially conflicting interests that the regulated 
sector is seeking to balance. Both cases focus on the nature of the ‘suspicion’, agreeing 
that, while it may be necessary to found suspicion on relevant facts, it is not necessary to 
prove that a criminal act has taken place.  It seems likely that, should an action for 
damages be raised in Scotland where a defence of lodging a SAR is put forward, the court 
would follow Shah. They would compel the regulated institution to evidence their 
‘suspicion’ but not go so far as to demand that they prove that such suspicion was ‘well-
founded’. 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that there is a need for a re-conceptualisation of the ‘private police’ to 
accommodate the role of the regulated sector in the AML framework. However, it is 
acknowledged that further research is required into the role of professional bodies as 
supervisory authorities under MLR 2007 to fully explore where the line can be drawn 
between public and private police. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the 
implementation of AML measures by the regulated sector increases the amount of 
intelligence available to policing agencies and thereby assists the public police in making 
appropriate operational choices. By making an initial SAR, the regulated sector is 
proactively driving policing investigation. Similarly, by supplying further information to 
the public police, they are supporting the public police investigations reactively. The role 
of the regulated sector is utilised by the public police as they are fundamentally tied 
together in their collation and dissemination of intelligence in AML operations. 
While it may be the case that the public police are able to force the hands of the regulated 
sector to co-operate through criminal sanctions under POCA 2002 and MLR 2007, it is 
equally or perhaps more significant that the public police rely on the regulated sector to 
highlight investigation potential and to collate such information that may become a 
significant intelligence resource retrospectively. While the regulated sector may be 
required to undertake activities characteristic of policing, they remain restrained by their 
responsibilities to private interests as was demonstrated in Shah v HSBC Private Bank Ltd.61   
Since the regulated sector are given a degree of flexibility and are able to balance their 
own and client interests, this means that they remain ‘private’ police rather than being 
subsumed into the state directed public police. Accordingly, the academic literature must 
adapt its conceptualisation of the ‘private police’ to reflect the role of the regulated sector 
in the AML framework. 
*** 
References   
Abbot, C. (2009). ‘The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008’, Environmental 
Law Review, 11 (1), pp. 38-45. 
Bayley, D. H. (2005). ‘What Do the Police Do?’, in T. Newburn (ed.), Police: Key Readings. 
Cullompton: Willan, pp. 141-148.  
Black, J. (2002). ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’, Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, 
27, pp. 1-35. 
                       
61 [2010] EWCA Civ 31. 
286  
Egan 
JCER  
 
 
Brodeur, J.-P. (1983). ‘High Policing and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of 
Political Activities’, Social Problems, 30, pp. 507-520. 
Brodeur, J.-P. and Shearing, C. (2005). ‘Configuring Security and Justice’, European Journal 
of Criminology, 2 (4), pp. 379-406. 
Cabinet Office. (2000). ‘Recovering the Proceeds of Crime’, Performance and Innovation 
Unit Report, Cabinet Office, London.  
Crawford, A. (2006). ‘Networked Governance and the Post-regulatory State?: Steering, 
Rowing and Anchoring the Provision of Policing and Security’, Theoretical 
Criminology, 10, pp. 449-479. 
Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S. and Burnett, J. (2005). Plural Policing: The Mixed 
Economy of Visible Patrols in England and Wales. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal Service. (2010). ‘Biggest ever proceeds of crime case nets 
$10 million for Scottish communities’, News release, COPFS, May, Available at 
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/News/Latest (accessed on 17 June 2010). 
De Koker, L. (2009). ‘Identifying and Managing Low Money Laundering Risk: Perspectives 
on FATF’s Risk-Based Guidance’, Journal of Financial Crime, 16 (4), pp. 334-352. 
Donnelly, D. and  Scott, K. (2005). Policing Scotland. Cullompton: Willan Publishing.  
Favarel-Garrigues, G. Godefroy, T. and Lascouomes, P. (2008). ‘Sentinels in the Banking 
Industry: Private Actors and the Fight against Money Laundering in France’, British 
Journal of Criminology, 48 (1), pp.1-19. 
Financial Action Task Force. (2008). Revised Mandate 2008-2012, (previously 2004-2012), 
FATF, April. Available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/document/10/0,3343,en_32250379_32236836_40433674_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(accessed 18 June 2010). 
Fitzpatrick, D. (2005). ‘Advising the Serious Organised Crime Agency: The Role of the 
Specialist Prosecutors’, Journal of Financial Crime, 12 (3), pp. 251-263. 
Fitzpatrick, D. (2006). ‘Crime Fighting in the Twenty-first century? A Practitioner’s 
Assessment of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 9 (2), pp. 129-140. 
G7. (1989). Economic Declaration released by the Summit of the Arch, 16 July. 
Gill, P. (2002). ‘Policing and Regulation: What is the Difference?’ Social Legal Studies, 11, 
pp. 523-546. 
Harfield, C. (2006). ‘SOCA: A Paradigm Shift in British Policing’, British Journal of 
Criminology, 46, pp. 743-761. 
Harvey, J. (2004). ‘Compliance and Reporting Issues Arising for Financial Institutions from 
Money Laundering Regulations: A Preliminary Cost Benefit Study’, Journal of 
Money Laundering Control, 7 (4), pp. 333-346. 
Harvey, J. (2005). ‘An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, 8 (4), pp. 339-345. 
Harvey, J. and Lau, S. (2009). ‘Crime-money, Reputation and Reporting’, Crime Law Social 
Change, 52, pp. 57-72. 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland and the Inspectorate of Prosecution in 
Scotland. (2009). ‘Joint Thematic Inspection on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’, 
October. 
HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland. (2000). ‘Making Crime Pay – Confiscation of 
Criminal Assets in Scotland’, HMICS.  
Hynes, P. Furlong, R. and Rudolf, N. (2009) International Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing: A UK Perspective. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
Innes, M., Fielding, N. and Cope, N. (2005). ‘The Appliance of Science?' The Theory and 
Practice of Crime Intelligence Analysis’, British Journal of Criminology, 45 (1) pp. 37-
57. 
International Monetary Fund. (2004). ‘Financial intelligence Units: An Overview’, 
Washington DC. 
   
The Role of the Regulated Sector in the UK AML Framework 
287 JCER 
 
 
Johnston, L. (2007). ‘The Trajectory of ‘Private Policing’, in A. Henry, A. and D. Smith, 
Transformations of Policing. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 25-49.  
Leong, A. (2007). ‘Anti-money Laundering Measures in the UK: A Review of Recent 
Legislation and FSA’s Risk-based Approach’, Company Lawyer, 28 (2), pp. 35-42. 
Loader, I. (1999). ‘Consumer Culture and the Commodification of Policing and Security’, 
Sociology, 33, pp. 373-392. 
Lyotard, J. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Marshall, P. (2010). ‘Does Shah v HSBC Private Bank Ltd Make the Anti-money Laundering 
Consent Regime Unworkable?’ Butterworth Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law, 25 (5), pp. 287-290. 
Martin, S. (2000). ‘Implementing ‘Best Value’: Local Public Services in Transition’, Public 
Administration, 78 (1), pp. 209–227. 
McLaughlin, E.. (2007). The New Police. London: Sage. 
McLaughlin, E. and Murji, K. (1999). ‘The Postmodern Condition of the Police’, Liverpool 
Law Review, 21, pp. 217-240. 
Mitsilegas, V. and Gilmore, B. (2007). ‘The EU Legislative Framework against Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global 
Standards’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 56 (1), pp. 119-140. 
Murray, K. (2010). ‘Dismantling Organised Crime Groups through Enforcement of the 
POCA Money Laundering Offences’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 13 (1), 
pp. 7-14. 
Rathmell, A. (2002). ‘Towards Postmodern Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 
17 (3), pp. 87-104. 
Reiner, R. (2000). The Politics of the Police, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Reiner, R. (2005). ‘Policing a Postmodern Society’, in T. Newburn (ed.), Policing: Key 
Readings. Cullompton: Willan. 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007). ‘Understanding Governance: Ten Years On’, Organization Studies, 
28 (8), pp. 1243-1264. 
Scottish Crime Drug Enforcement Agency. (2006). ‘Annual Report 2005-6’, SDEA. Available 
at http://www.scdea.police.uk/publications.htm (accessed on 20 June 2010). 
Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency. (2010). ‘Strategic Plan 2010-2015’, SCDEA. 
Available at http://www.scdea.police.uk/publications.htm (accessed on 20 June 
2010). 
Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency. (2001). ‘Annual Report 2000-1’, SDEA. Available at 
http://www.scdea.police.uk/publications.htm (accessed on 20 June 2010). 
Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency. (2002). ‘Annual Report 2001-2’, SDEA, Available at 
http://www.scdea.police.uk/publications.htm (accessed on 20 June 2010). 
Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency. (2003). ‘Annual Report 2002-3’, SDEA. Available at 
http://www.scdea.police.uk/publications.htm (accessed on 20 June 2010). 
Scottish Government. (2009). ‘Letting Our Communities Flourish: A Strategy for Tackling 
Serious Organised Crime in Scotland’. The Serious Organised Crime Taskforce, 
Scottish Government. Available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/06/01144911/0 (accessed 20 June 
2010). 
Scottish Government. (2010). ‘Letting Our Communities Flourish - One Year On: A Strategy 
for Tackling Serious Organised Crime in Scotland’. The Serious Organised Crime 
Taskforce, Scottish Government. Available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/06/01111748/0 (accessed 20 June 
2010). 
Scottish Serious Organised Crime Group Mapping Project. (2010). ‘Preliminary Findings on 
the Scale and Extent of Serious Organised Crime in Scotland’, SCDEA. Available at: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/crimes/organised-
crime/soc/MappingOrgCrim (accessed 20 June 2010). 
288  
Egan 
 
 
JCER  
Serious Organised Crime Agency. (2010). ‘Annual Plan 2010/2011’, SOCA. Available at 
http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-soca/library (accessed 20 June 2010). 
Serious Organised Crime Agency. (2009). ‘SARs Annual Report 2009’, SOCA. Available at: 
http://www.soca.gov.uk/about-soca/the-uk-financial-intelligence-unit/ukfiu-
publications (accessed 20 June 2010). 
Serious Organised Crime Agency. (2010) ‘The UK Threat Assessment of Organised Crime 
2009/10’, SOCA. Available at: http://www.soca.gov.uk/threats (accessed 20 June 
2010). 
Shearing, C. D. (1993). ‘A Constitutive Conception of Regulation’ in P. Grabosky and J. 
Braithwaite (eds), Business Regulation and Australia’s Future. Canberra: Australian 
Institute of Criminology. 
Sheptycki, J. (1998). ‘Policing, Postmodernism and Transnationalization’, British Journal of 
Criminology, 38 (3). 
Sheptycki, J. (2002). ‘Accountability Across the Policing Field; Towards a General 
Cartography of Accountability for Post-modern Policing’, Policing & Society, 
Special Issue on Police Accountability in Europe (Guest Editor Monica den Boer), 12 
(4), pp. 323-338. 
Sproat, P. (2007). ‘The New Policing of Assets and the New Assets of Policing: A Tentative 
Financial Cost-benefit Analysis of the UK’s Anti-money Laundering and Asset 
Recovery Regime’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 10 (3), pp. 277-299. 
Sproat, P. (2009a). ‘To what Extent is the UK's Anti-money Laundering and Asset Recovery 
Regime Used against Organised Crime?’ Journal of Money Laundering Control, 12 
(2), pp. 134-150. 
Sproat, P. (2009b). ‘Payback Time? To what Extent has the New Policing of Assets Provided 
New Assets for Policing?’ Journal of Money Laundering Control, 12 (4), pp. 392-405. 
Swinton, K. (2007). ‘When Do You Suspect it is Reasonable to Disclose?’ Scottish Law 
Gazette, 75 (2), pp. 52-54. 
Vaughan, B. (2007). ‘The Provision of Policing and the Problem of Pluralism’, Theoretical 
Criminology, 11, pp. 347-363. 
Verhage, A. (2009a). ‘Compliance and AML in Belgium: a Booming Sector with Growing 
Pains’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 12 (2), pp. 113-133. 
Verhage, A. (2009b). ‘The Anti-money Laundering Complex: Power Pantomime or 
Potential Playoff?’, in J. Shapland and P. Ponsaers (eds), The Informal Economy and 
Connections with Organised Crime. The Hague: BJu Legal Publishers. 
Williams, J. (2005). ‘Reflections on the Private versus Public Policing of Economic Crime’, 
British Journal of Criminology, 45, pp. 316-336. 
*** 
Copyright of Journal of Contemporary European Research is the property of University Association for
Contemporary European Studies (UACES) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or
posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print,
download, or email articles for individual use.
